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The Doha Agricultural Market Access Negotiations: 
Remaining Conceptual, Practical, and Technical Issues 
 
Abstract 
Before  the  World  Trade  Organization’s  (WTO)  Doha  round  of  multilateral  trade 
negotiations can be concluded negotiators will need to agree on a host of market 
access issues, including the size of tariff cuts, a methodology for opening tariff quotas 
in the case of products exempted from applying full tariff cuts, and the amount of 
flexibility  to  be  provided  under  special  and  differential  treatment  for  developing 
countries. Each of these issues harbours a number of complex problems that will have 
to be addressed. How these are resolved could have significant impacts on the actual 
level  of  market  access  created  by  the  final  agreement.  This  paper  analyses  the 
extensive inventory of outstanding issues yet to be resolved if an effective outcome is 
to be reached. 
Introduction 
The Doha agricultural negotiations have been contentious from the outset, with the 
market  access  debate  arguably  the  most  challenging  of  the  three  agricultural 
negotiating pillars; the other two are domestic support and export competition. The 
basis for the agricultural market access negotiations is the mandate set out in the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration (adopted on 14 November 2001), which commits members to 
“substantial  improvements  in  market  access  for  all  products.”  At  the  same  time, 
Members agreed, “special and differential treatment for developing countries shall be 
an integral part of all elements of the negotiations” and that “non-trade concerns will 
be  taken  into  account  in  the  negotiations.”  The  search  for  common  ground  to 
accommodate  these  three  goals  would  test  even  the  wisest  and  most  objective  of 
mediators. For negotiators promoting their country’s best interests it has so far proven 
intractable.  In  July  2006,  after  four  and  a  half  years,  the  Doha  round  of  trade 
negotiations  was  suspended.  At  a  meeting  of  trade  ministers  from  many  WTO 
member countries in Davos, Switzerland in early 2007, agreement was reached to 
restart negotiations in the near future (World Economic Forum 2007).   3 
According to the World Bank, almost two-thirds of the economic gains that would 
come from dismantling all merchandise trade barriers and the more distorting forms 
of  farm  subsidies  globally  would  come  from  agriculture.  Within  agriculture,  an 
estimated 93 percent of the gains would come from eliminating import tariffs, versus 
only  2  percent  from  discontinuing  export  subsidies  and  5  percent  from  removing 
domestic support measures (Hertel and Keeney, 2005).
1 Recognizing the importance 
of  reaching  an  agreement  to  reduce  subsidies  and  increase  market  access  in 
agriculture,  WTO  Members  remain  committed  to  resolving  their  differences  and 
completing  an  agreement.  Technical  discussions  have  continued  to  take  place  in 
Geneva  on  aspects  of  the  modalities  while  the  round  has  been  suspended.  The 
modalities are the nuts and bolts of trade agreements and include the formulas and 
other technical parameters for tariff reductions and quota expansions. While there has 
been substantive agreement on some of the broad aspects of these modalities, most of 
the specifics have yet to be finalized. They cover a multifaceted set of intricate issues 
and the way in which each is finally resolved will have significant implications for the 
level of market access provided. 
Our objective in this paper is to carefully review the numerous outstanding market 
access issues being discussed. It is hoped that this effort can shed some light on why 
negotiators have been proceeding cautiously in arriving at agreement and why there is 
still a need for judicious and meticulous work before an agreement can be reached. 
From this catalogue of issues, we will also draw out some areas where the agricultural 
economics community can make a substantial contribution. 
We categorize these issues as conceptual, practical, or technical. In actuality, these 
categories may overlap and there is some uncertainty as to where each issue is best 
placed. A general distinction, however, can be made across the categories. Conceptual 
market access issues tend to be broader in scope and form the foundation of what is 
considered attainable in the negotiations. Practical issues tend to revolve around the 
need to settle on what specific approach or direction will be taken in the negotiations. 
In many cases, they must be resolved before a solution is achievable at the technical 
                                                 
1  Other  studies have  attributed lesser proportions  to market  access, but all  agree that  the bulk of 
welfare gains come from eliminating policies in this pillar.   4 
level.  Technical  issues  tend  to  cover  matters  that  deal  with  narrowly  defined 
questions. Many are issues that must be addressed before members can prepare their 
”schedules of concessions” which detail specific commitments – including tariff cuts 
– each Member makes as a result of trade negotiations. 
We stress that this represents our own interpretation of progress in the agricultural 
market access negotiations and does not necessarily reflect the view of our respective 
governments or employers. Most of our observations are based on three key WTO 
documents – the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001 (WTO 2001), 
the General Council Decision of 1 August 2004 (WTO 2004 - also called the “July 
Framework”),  and  the  Hong  Kong  Ministerial  Declaration  of  18  December  2005 
(WTO  2005).  Also  important  is  the  paper  prepared  by  the  Chair  of  the  WTO’s 
Committee on Agriculture, Ambassador Crawford Falconer (New Zealand), entitled 
“Draft Possible Modalities in Agriculture” (WTO 2006a) and the report of the chair of 
the negotiating group on market access (WTO 2006b). The market access portion of 
the Hong Kong text is reproduced in the appendix. 
Conceptual Issues 
With  global  agricultural  tariffs  averaging  over  60  percent  and  with  extreme  tariff 
dispersion across countries and products – some having very high tariffs and others 
very  low  –  this  difference  in  tariffs  clearly  influences  the  amount  of  agricultural 
production in different countries, the pattern of world trade and the prices that farmers 
receive globally. In addition, numerous instances of tariff escalation occur, where 
tariff  rates  are  based  on  the  level  of  processing  within  a  product,  with  primary 
products being levied the lowest rates (see Burman et al, 2001 and Sharma, 2006b). 
By  encouraging  imports  of  relatively  unprocessed  agricultural  commodities  at  the 
expense of more processed products, importers seek to protect domestic processing 
industries and capture value added locally. 
Very early in the negotiations, WTO Members decided that they would attempt to 
address these two very important conceptual market access issues – the existence of 
extreme or peak tariffs and tariff escalation – by using a harmonization tariff cutting 
formula which would apply larger percentage cuts to higher tariffs, resulting in tariffs 
being closer together after the cuts are applied. While this was both an ambitious and   5 
admirable decision it has undoubtedly prolonged the negotiations. Members could 
have opted instead to use a simple linear tariff cutting formula which would have 
lowered all tariffs by the same percentage, as had been done in the Kennedy Round of 
multilateral  trade  negotiations.  Alternatively,  Members  could  have  applied  the 
Uruguay Round agricultural tariff cutting formula, which allowed countries to choose 
their own reduction for each tariff line (subject to a minimum cut and a requirement to 
achieve  an  average  tariff  reduction  across  all  lines).  Neither  of  these  alternatives 
would  require  agreement  on  how  to  treat  different  types  of  tariffs  or  require 
agreement on critical cut off points for larger tariff cuts. Either option would have 
been easier to negotiate. However, neither a simple linear cut nor the Uruguay Round 
formula addresses the dual problems of tariff dispersion and tariff escalation and the 
latter  formula  could  potentially  exacerbate  both.
2  After  considering  numerous 
complex  harmonization  formulas,  WTO  Members  agreed  on  an  approach  that 
allocates tariffs by size into four tiers, with the top tier containing the highest tariffs 
being reduced by the greatest amount and the bottom tier containing the lowest tariffs 
being reduced by the smallest amount. 
Another conceptual issue was what to do with the tariff quotas (also referred to as 
tariff rate quotas or TRQs) that were created during the Uruguay Round. In cases 
where non-tariff barriers had been converted to tariffs, countries were required to 
create tariff quotas. These tariff quotas were designed to allow at least a minimum 
level of additional trade to occur even when tariffs were bound at prohibitively high 
levels. Moreover, where exporters enjoyed preferential access in the past, this was 
protected by the provision of quota allocations within the tariff quotas. These tariff 
quotas were hardly the “jewel in the crown” of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture as 
they can lead to government intervention in agricultural trade and provide incentives 
for rent-seekers to lobby for them to be kept in place (Josling, 1998). 
There are essentially two ways to address the problem of tariff quotas or make them 
less relevant. If the over-quota tariff is prohibitive, it can be reduced to a level where 
trade in excess of the quota begins to occur. In this case, the quota will still provide 
                                                 
2 It is worth noting that there is an element of harmonization in a linear tariff cutting formula in that a 
flat percentage cut across all tariffs results in a greater percentage cut in the duty-paid import price for 
higher tariff items than for lower tariff items.    6 
rents to those who hold the rights to import under it, but the over-quota tariff will 
determine how much trade takes place. Alternatively, one can expand the quota to a 
level where it is no longer effectively limiting trade. Generally, negotiators decided to 
focus on reducing the over-quota rate using the tiered formula rather than increasing 
the  quota. Expanding  existing  quotas to  achieve  additional  trade  would  also  have 
required either eliminating the in-quota tariff or reducing it to  a level that would 
ensure the expanded trade occured. Likewise, negotiators would have had to focus on 
disciplining the administration of tariff quotas in order to assure that the quotas were 
being given every opportunity to be filled. While they chose not to require Uruguay 
Round tariff quotas be expanded, they are considering whether to bind and reduce or 
eliminate in-quota tariffs. Negotiators will also discuss the issue of disciplining the 
administration of tariff quotas. 
Another conceptual issue is a requirement to address non-trade concerns in the Doha 
mandate (WTO 2003). The Uruguay Round tariff cutting formula provided Members 
with  extensive  flexibility  to  subject  the  tariffs  on  their  most  politically  sensitive 
products  to  minimal  cuts  (15  percent  for  developed  countries,  10  percent  for 
developing countries). In the view of some WTO Members, flexibility for politically 
sensitive  products  had  been  codified  in  Article  20(c)  of  the  WTO  Agreement  on 
Agriculture through wording to take into account non-trade concerns, a commitment 
reaffirmed in the Doha Ministerial Declaration (WTO 2001). An early attempt by the 
then Chair of the WTO’s Committee on Agriculture, Ambassador Harbinson from 
Hong Kong - China, to provide flexibility within a formula that cut high tariffs by 
greater amounts was proposed in March 2003 and was roundly rejected (WTO 2003). 
In its place, it has been agreed to allow Members to designate a limited number of 
tariff lines as Sensitive Products (SePs
3), subject to lower reduction commitments 
with  the  deviation,  or  lower  cut,  being  “paid  for”  by tariff  quotas  to  ensure  that 
improved market access will be achieved for all products.
4 
                                                 
3 This conference paper provides readers with a guide to the extensive list of abbreviations typically 
used in the negotiations and related papers, but in most instances the full term is used in this paper. The 
authors feel that such a guide will provide readers with an enhanced ability to understand and compare 
WTO related papers – but that the use of the full terms improves the flow and readability of this paper. 
4 There is still some question about whether, for some Sensitive Products, the reduced tariff cut may 
simply be subjected to a shorter implementation period, rather than opening a quota. Alternatively, for   7 
As mentioned, the Doha Ministerial Declaration requires that “special and differential 
treatment for developing countries shall be an integral part of all elements of the 
negotiations.” Early in the negotiations, consultations were held on the creation of a 
"development box" to contain special and differential (S&DT) provisions that would 
apply only to developing countries. In particular, the development box would give 
greater latitude for developing countries’ agricultural support measures. At this stage 
in  the  negotiations,  demands  for  an  explicit  development  box  have  been  muted, 
although  one  of  the  early  development  box  proposals,  to  allow  each  developing 
country to designate a limited number of tariff lines in their tariff schedule as Special 
Products (SPs), has been agreed. Special Products will be either subject to lesser cuts, 
totally exempt from cuts, or a mix of the two (a proportion exempt and the rest subject 
to  lesser  cuts).  There  has  also  been  discussion  to  create  a  Special  Safeguard 
Mechanism (SSM), which would allow developing countries to temporarily impose 
higher tariffs on certain products in the event that import volumes exceed or import 
prices drop below some recent historical average. 
As mentioned, not all of the conceptual issues raised by Members will necessarily be 
dealt with in these negotiations. Some are on the table, so to speak, in that they are 
mentioned  in  the  Chairman’s  reference  paper  on  market  access  (WTO  2006a), 
although they have not been subject to much discussion. Others have not been part of 
the negotiations, but have been discussed in previous multilateral trade talks and are 
seen  to  represent  potential  impediments  toward maximizing  market  access  once  a 
final agreement is negotiated. One conceptual issue, however, that was considered and 
rapidly dismissed by most Members was a proposal that tariff reductions be made off 
the actual most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff that countries applied to their imports 
rather than the bound tariff. Many countries, particularly developing countries, apply 
tariffs  on  their  imports  that  are  considerably  below  their  allowable  bound  rates. 
Making  cuts  to  the  applied  tariff  would  ensure  that  the  goal  of  substantial 
improvements in market access for all products was achieved. Despite this, it would 
be unprecedented to require countries that were unilaterally applying lower tariffs to 
                                                                                                                                           
some Sensitive Products, the  Member might be  allowed  to take the full  cut required by the tiered 
formula, but over a longer implementation period. No final decision has been made on these options.   8 
make cuts that would be effectively deeper than their counterparts who were applying 
tariffs at the bound rate. 
A conceptual issue still under active consideration is whether to require Members to 
simplify their agricultural tariffs. The simplest and most frequently used tariff type is 
the ad valorem tariff, under which the duty is expressed as a percentage of the value 
of the good. However, there are a number of other types of tariff, which are more 
complex and can be much less transparent (see box on tariff formulations). Many 
economists have stressed the advantages of increasing transparency in tariff schedules 
by  curbing  the  use  of  tariffs  that  are  not  expressed  in ad  valorem  terms  (see  for 
example,  Laird,  1998;  Gibson,  et  al,  2001;  and  Bureau  and  Salvatici,  2004). 
Moreover, economists have demonstrated that non-ad valorem tariffs can have an ad 
valorem equivalence that is larger for developing country exports than for similar 
products exported by developed countries. One analysis of U.S. specific agricultural 
tariffs computed the ratio of these duties to the average unit value of imports for over 
300  tariff  lines  at  which  both  groups  of  countries  were  competing  (Wainio  and 
Gibson, 2004). The results showed that the average ad valorem equivalent was equal 
to 8.3 percent for developing countries and only 2.5 percent for similar products from 
developed countries. The 230 percent difference is largely a function of the import 
unit prices for developing country products, which tended to be lower than for similar 
products from developed countries.  
There is much to be said for simplifying tariff regimes by requiring that all tariffs be 
expressed in ad valorem terms. Alternatively, for agriculture, Members may agree to 
limit the formulation of non-ad valorem tariffs to a simple specific rate (no complex 
or technical tariffs would be allowed). Market access negotiations on general goods 
other than agricultural products (generally called NAMA for non agricultural market 
access – note that NAMA also covers fish and  forestry products) have covered a 
number  of  the  same  issues  facing  the  agricultural  negotiations.  For  example,  the 
NAMA negotiations have agreed to convert all non-ad valorem tariffs to ad valorem   9 
equivalents apply a harmonising Swiss type formula
5 and bind the resulting tariffs in 
ad valorem terms (WTO 2006b).  
 
Tariff schedules would also be simpler and more transparent if all countries bound 
their tariffs at the HS6-digit level. This is the most disaggregated level at which the 
World  Customs  Organization’s  Harmonized  System  (HS)  nomenclature  classifies 
internationally  traded  goods.
6  Not  only  would  this  simplify  assessing  the  level  of 
                                                 
5  The  Swiss  formula  is  a  harmonizing  tariff  reduction  formula  which  uses  a  single  mathematical 
formula  which,  when  applied  to  WTO  members’  tariff  schedules,  has  the  effect  of  reducing  and 
harmonising all tariffs. 
6 In order to have fully consistent tariff schedules across  countries, tariff commitments should not 
exceed the 6-digit level as defined by the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 
(generally referred to as the “Harmonized System” or simply the “HS”). The HS is a multipurpose 
Tariff Formulations 
In addition to ad valorem tariffs, which are levied as a proportion of imports, there 
are specific tariffs, under which the duty is fixed as a value for a physical unit, 
such as $50 per ton or 10 Euros per hectolitre.  Mixed or compound tariffs are a 
combination of specific and ad valorem rates, for example, $50 per ton plus 20 
percent (of the value of the product).  Mixed tariffs may be expressed in other 
ways  as  well,  such  as  $50  per  ton  or  20  percent,  whichever  is  the  greater.
1  
Technical tariffs are rates determined by technical factors such as sugar or alcohol 
content.    These  tariffs  are  generally  considered  the  most  complex  and  non-
transparent rates, since they depend on information not generally available in trade 
statistics.    Finally,  there  are  tariffs  called  variable  levies,  where  the  duty  is 
generally set to bring the price of an imported product up to a certain level.  Under 
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, variable duties in agriculture are prohibited, 
although  some  countries  interpret  this  as  a  constraint  only  if  the  duty  levied 
exceeds their binding commitment.  Countries can achieve a somewhat similar 
effect without using variable levies by splitting tariff lines for the same product, 
charging  higher  rates  for  lower-priced  imports  or  charging  higher  rates  during 
times of the year when they want to limit the import of lower-priced imports, such 
as during the growing season in the importing country (seasonal tariffs).   10 
market access being offered in negotiations by making it easier to analyse tariff and 
trade statistics simultaneously, it would also provide benefits for trade facilitation and 
enhance the ability of members to monitor and protect the value of tariff concessions 
in the WTO (Bureau and Salvatici, 2004). If countries did bind tariffs at the HS6-digit 
level,  countries  would  still  be  able  to  apply  different  tariff  rates  at  a  more 
disaggregated  level  as  long  as  they  do  not  exceed  the  bound  level.  Despite  the 
advantages of requiring Members to bind their tariffs at the HS6-digit level, we are 
unaware of any proposals which favour this concept. 
Another conceptual market access issue not on the agenda but with implications for 
developing country exports has to do with the price level at which ad valorem duties 
are valued. Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States are among the few 
countries that assess these duties on an f.o.b. basis. Most countries tend to make the 
assessment at the c.i.f. level, which means that, all other things being equal, duties are 
higher in countries paying higher-than-average transport costs, such as land-locked 
countries.
7 Requiring duties to be paid on transport and insurance as well as on the 
value of the product discriminates against trading partners based on geography and 
other factors. Simply requiring countries to use an f.o.b. valuation base would lower 
tariff  barriers  and  ensure  that  ad  valorem  tariffs  in  countries  like  Japan  and  the 
European  Union  did  not  have  a  greater  protective  effect  than  identical  rates  in 
Australia or the U.S.  
In  his  paper  on  possible  modalities,  the  current  chair  of  the  WTO  agricultural 
negotiations, Chairman Falconer, cites a proposal to make provisions for negotiating 
“the elimination of non-tariff measures affecting trade in commodities” (WTO, 2006). 
It is not clear what non-tariff measures Chairman Falconer is referring to, although in 
the Doha Declaration, Members agreed to take concrete action to address issues and 
concerns that have been raised by many developing-country members regarding the 
                                                                                                                                           
international product nomenclature developed by the World Customs Organization. It comprises about 
5,000 commodity groups, each identified by a six digit code, arranged in a legal and logical structure 
supported by well-defined rules to achieve uniform classification. The system is used by more than 190 
countries or economies as a basis for their Customs tariffs and for the collection of international trade 
statistics. Over 98 percent of the merchandise in international trade is classified in terms of the HS. 
7 The abbreviations f.o.b. and c.i.f. mean “free on board” and “including costs, insurance and freight to 
port of destination.”   11 
implementation of the Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade and the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. There is certainly no shortage of complaints 
to the WTO about technical and sanitary and phytosanitary measures, the two best 
known types of non-tariff measures restricting trade in agriculture. Many products are 
covered  jointly  by  high  tariffs  and  non-tariff  measures,  so  when  the  tariff  is  cut 
imports may not increase without addressing the non-tariff measure. 
A related issue has to do with importing state trading enterprises (STEs). WTO rules 
allow countries to grant “single desk privileges” or monopolies to STEs, although this 
can  create  opportunities  for  import  restrictions  that  could  certainly  fall  under  the 
heading of non-tariff measures. In the negotiations to date, much attention has been 
focussed on disciplines for developed countries’ exporting STEs, but little attention 
has been focussed on importing STEs. In many cases, importing STEs have been 
granted the rights for importing part or all products under a tariff quota. In some 
instances,  these  bodies  are  quasi-government  agencies  with  objectives  that  could 
conflict or supersede profit motives and in other cases are actually peak farm groups 
or  national  commodity  associations.  In  these  circumstances,  there  can  be  strong 
incentives to import less than a market optimum amount or, if the transfer is based on 
production  levels,  boost  domestic  production  by  transferring  rents  to  domestic 
farmers. 
Finally,  it  is  widely  accepted  that  the  Least  Developed  Countries  (LDCs)  will  be 
provided a more extensive level of S&DT. In market access this includes exempting 
LDCs from having to reduce tariffs. There is an important conceptual issue here that, 
while perhaps too politically sensitive to broach in the negotiations is still worthy of 
mention here. Is special and differential treatment for developing countries in the 
form of exemption from tariff cuts or shallower tariff cuts and longer implementation 
periods really a valuable concession for these countries? It certainly is if one takes a 
mercantilist approach to trade negotiations, where success is based on the ratio of 
increased  exports  to  increased  imports.  Most  economists,  however,  would  base 
success on the level of increased economic welfare and would argue that special and 
differential treatment in the form of no or limited tariff cuts hampers the ability of 
developing countries to achieve the welfare gains that would result from their own 
liberalization.    12 
Practical Issues 
Having agreed on the use of a tiered formula for reducing tariffs and tariff disparity, 
with  a  working  hypothesis  of  dividing  tariffs  into  four  tiers,  Members  must  now 
decide on the tariff thresholds for defining the tiers and the depth of reduction to be 
applied in each tier. There is also the practical issue that the tiered formula would 
leave  some  very  high  tariffs  in  place.  Whether to  impose  an  overall  tariff  cap  to 
address this also remains under negotiation. Finally, there is the need to agree on the 
base period from which tariff reductions will be implemented as well as the period 
over  which  the  cuts  will  take  place.  The  former  is  only  important  in  those  few 
remaining cases where Members still have tariffs that have not been bound. In these 
cases, the actual duty applied on a specified date or over some period of time should 
be  used.  Likewise,  the  choice  of  a  base  period  would  have  also  assumed  more 
importance if Members had agreed to use the applied MFN tariff, which can change 
over  time,  as  the  starting  point  for  tariff  reductions.  As  for  the  length  of 
implementation period over which tariffs will be reduced, five years appears to be the 
expected length for developed countries. It is also assumed that cuts will be made in 
equal instalments, although it has been proposed by some developing countries that a 
down payment be made by developed countries. In other words, that their cuts be 
front loaded with deeper cuts made in the early years. 
Regarding the goal of reducing tariff escalation, there is the issue of agreeing on a list 
of primary and processed products. One country has submitted a list that Members 
may decide to use as  a first approximation. It is not clear whether this  will be a 
contentious issue, although there will no doubt be some changes made to the list 
before it is agreed. After Members prepare their draft Schedules based on the tiered 
formula cuts and after taking advantage of Sensitive and Special Product provisions, 
negotiators will have another practical issue to grapple with – will additional cuts be 
required  to  tariffs  on  processed  products  if  they  remain  above  the  tariffs  on  raw 
materials. 
With respect to Uruguay Round tariff quotas,  Members may take up the issue of 
Special Safeguards (SSG), which allow countries, which reserved the right, to levy an 
additional, time-limited duty on tariff quota products in the event of import surges or 
low world prices.  The Agreement on Agriculture (Article 5, paragraph 9) states that   13 
the SSG will remain in force for “the duration of the reform process” although there is 
considerable  disagreement  on  what  this  phrase  means  and  what  the  original 
negotiators intended. It was considered a necessary instrument to alleviate the fears of 
some Members that the removal of non-tariff measures might result in a surge in 
imports  or  in  a  decline  in  domestic  prices  if  over-quota  tariffs  did  not  provide 
sufficient protection. Some countries have proposed eliminating the SSG, claiming 
that  the  use  (or  abuse)  of  the  measure  has  limited  market  access  for  tariff  quota 
products. In particular, there is the issue of safeguards being imposed when increases 
in  imports  are  unrelated  to  international  conditions,  but  rather  to  domestic  crop 
failures or changes in domestic consumption. 
There  also  remain  a  number  of  practical  issues  to  be  resolved  concerning  the 
provision of Sensitive Products, although much of the remaining detail on this issue is 
also  of  a  highly  technical  nature.  Sensitive  Products  will  be  subject  to  a  lesser 
reduction  than  that  required  by  the  tiered  formula,  although  there  has  been  no 
agreement  on  how  much  less.  It  also  remains  to  be  determined  how  this  lesser 
reduction  will  be  “paid  for”  by  Members.  The  July  2004  Framework  agreement 
(WTO 2004) states that a “substantial improvement” in market access for Sensitive 
Products will be achieved through a combination of tariff quota commitments and 
tariff reductions. This may result in the creation of new tariff quotas, although it has 
also been proposed that. in some cases the reduced tariff cut on the Sensitive Product 
might be implemented over a shorter period, or the full cut implemented over a longer 
period, in lieu of a quota commitment. Negotiators are now considering numerous 
technical approaches to deal with tariff lines without existing quotas which may be 
designated as Sensitive Products. In addition to technical issues, there are the practical 
ones  of  whether  the  quota  will  be  available  on  a  MFN  basis,  whether  the  quota 
administration method will be circumscribed in some way, and whether the in-quota 
tariff will be bound at zero or left for Member’s to set at a level low enough to allow 
the quota to fill as was supposed to have been done with the Uruguay Round tariff 
quotas. 
There also remains to be agreed the number of tariff lines that each Member will be 
allowed  to  designate  as  a  Sensitive  Product.  This  could  have  been  a  relatively 
straightforward number to negotiate if Member’s Tariff Schedules were all bound on   14 
the consistent basis of the HS6-digit level. While many are, there are also several 
Members  that  have  bound  their  agricultural  tariffs  at  the  HS8-digit,  or  a  more 
disaggregated,  level.  This  means  that  some  Members  can  have  significantly  more 
tariff lines than others, so there is an equity issue if the number of Sensitive Products 
is based on a proportion of all lines. Likewise, Chairman Falconer has pointed out that 
any fixed percentage or number of tariff lines can lead to very different levels of trade 
coverage, with some countries being able to cover a high percentage of trade under 
the Sensitive Product status and others only a low percentage (WTO, 2006a). There is 
also a question of whether this proportion would be based on all lines or limited to 
only  lines  with  non-zero  tariffs.  Finally,  there  is  the  practical  issue  of  whether 
Sensitive  Products  will  have  a  limited  life  or  whether  their  “special  status”  will 
carryover to subsequent multilateral trade negotiations. 
It should not be a surprise that in the broad area of S&DT provisions that practical 
issues abound. The most common forms of S&DT provisions involve lower tariff cuts 
and  longer  implementation  periods  for  developing  countries.  However,  there  are 
several ways to measure these provisions when it comes to tariff cuts. During the 
Uruguay Round, developed countries were required to cut their agricultural tariffs, on 
average, by 36 percent and developing countries by two-thirds of that amount, or 24 
percent. As the two-thirds amount is considered somewhat of a norm for S&DT on 
tariff  cuts,  there  is  some  practical  appeal  to  subjecting  each  tier  for  developing 
countries’ tariffs to two-thirds the cut required for developed countries. But, applying 
a formula that cuts higher tariffs by greater amounts suggests that countries with the 
highest bound tariffs will be required to make the deepest average cuts. In general, 
countries with the highest bound tariffs tend to be developing countries, which could 
result in some developing countries having to impose average cuts across all tariffs 
that  are  more  than  two-thirds  of  those  required  for  some  developed  country 
counterparts. This could be an issue for negotiators should developing countries insist 
on  using  the  Uruguay  Round measure  to  gauge  the  S&DT  they receive  (Sharma, 
2006a).  
Applying higher tariff thresholds to define the tiers for developing countries may 
somewhat ameliorate this problem, as could the choice of a tariff cap, should one be 
agreed.  A  related  issue  arises  from  the  fact  that  some  developing  countries  have   15 
ceiling bindings with homogeneous or uniform tariffs at high levels, such as 100 or 
200 percent. If their entire tariff schedule falls into the tier subject to the deepest cuts, 
should they be subject to those cuts, especially since they will have access to both the 
Sensitive and Special Product exemptions? Or, should they be allowed to distribute 
these tariffs across the various tiers, as has been proposed by some affected countries? 
With regard to the Special Products option, some of the practical issues to be decided 
are similar to those for Sensitive Products. There is a need to agree on the number of 
tariff lines eligible for Special Products status, the depth of cut for these tariffs and 
whether some will be exempt from any  cut, whether some market access will be 
required  in the  form  of  a  quota,  and  whether  Special  Products  status  will  have  a 
limited life. There has also been considerable discussion of how these products will be 
identified. Agreement appears to have been reached that developing countries will 
have the flexibility to self-designate tariff lines for Special Products status based on 
the criteria of food security, livelihood security, or rural development (WTO 2005). 
Considerable work remains, however, in determining meaningful indicators that are 
accurate enough for this purpose. 
Another practical issue has to do with whether the level of S&DT should be the same 
for all developing countries. Without question, the least developed countries are to be 
accorded a different level of S&DT, but there have also been proposals to provide 
some  additional  form  of  S&DT  to  other  countries  including  small,  vulnerable 
economies and recently acceded members. A more controversial proposal, however, 
is whether the richer developing countries be granted a lesser amount of S&DT - 
particularly  those  with  modern  and  efficient  agricultural  sectors,  or  those  that  are 
significant  net  food  exporting  countries,  to  use  a  definition  from  an  early  joint 
proposal by the US and EU. There are a number of problems associated with doing 
this, not the least of which would be the potential for countries to have one status in 
the agricultural negotiations and another in the non-agricultural negotiations. On this 
issue, it is possible no agreement will be reached, although the richer developing 
countries may be willing to make greater concessions toward LDCs than their less 
wealthy counterparts.  
There  is  already  acceptance  that  both  developed  countries  and  “those  developing 
countries  in  a  position  to  do  so”  will  implement  duty-free  and  quota-free  market   16 
access for products originating from least developed countries. How and when this 
will be implemented is yet to be agreed, although there is agreement that countries 
that  are  not  in  an  immediate  position  to  extend  this  market  access  on  all  least 
developed  country  imports  will  be  able  to  temporarily  limit  it  to  97  per  cent  of 
products originating from LDCs, defined at the tariff line level, (WTO, 2005). Even 
though  there  could  be  rules-of-origin  requirements  that  could  limit  this  trade 
opportunity, it would still appear to be a more practical and valuable form of S&DT 
than  allowing  least  developed  countries  to  forego  cutting  their  own  tariffs,  thus 
missing out on the benefits they would get from their own liberalization.8 However, 
even this concession implies unintended consequences.  
Countries that already benefit from non-reciprocal tariff concessions have raised a 
concern that they would be hurt if the margins of preference on their imports are cut. 
As a result, another of the practical issues being grappled with in the market access 
negotiations is whether there will be any attempt to mitigate this or provide some sort 
of compensation for developing countries that see their exports decrease or prices fall 
when preferential margins are eroded. The importance of long-standing preferences is 
fully  recognized  in  these  negotiations  and  proposals  regarding  preference  erosion 
have  been  made  and  discussed.  One  proposal  has  even  linked  the  selection  of 
Sensitive Products in developed countries to developing country exports that have 
been subject to longstanding non-reciprocal tariff preferences. There is also a proposal 
for longer implementation periods for these products, although Members are far from 
converging on this issue. This will surely also be a concern in later multilateral trade 
negotiations for products from least developed countries that benefit from duty-free 
and quota-free access. 
There are also practical issues associated with the Special Safeguard Mechanism to 
allow developing countries to temporarily impose higher tariffs on certain products in 
the  event  that  import  volumes  exceed  or  import  prices  drop  below  some  recent 
historical average. How many products will be allowed access to the SSM and will 
                                                 
8 Rules-of-origin are administrative requirements that define the proportion of local content required in 
any  product  for  that  product  to  qualify  for  preferential  market  access  and  detail  the  documentary 
evidence required to access the preferential tariff. Rules-of-origin can limit the ability of developing 
countries to import raw materials from third countries and export the processed final product.   17 
there be criteria attached to SSM access? As with Sensitive and Special Products, will 
the SSM have a limited life or take on the sort of permanency associated with the 
Uruguay Round Special Safeguard? 
In addition to considering whether the level of S&DT should be the same for all 
developing countries, there has also been discussion about different levels of S&DT 
across commodities. In the General Council Decision of 1 August 2004, Members 
agreed that, “Full implementation of the long-standing commitment to achieve the 
fullest  liberalisation  of  trade  in  tropical  agricultural  products  and  for  products  of 
particular importance to the diversification of production from the growing of illicit 
narcotic  crops  is  overdue  and  will  be  addressed  effectively  in  the  market  access 
negotiations (WTO, 2004).” Coming up with a list of products eligible for this “fullest 
liberalisation of trade” has proven controversial as there are few agricultural goods 
not farmed between the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn. 
The  Doha  agricultural  negotiations  have  also  seen  cotton  singled  out  for  possible 
special  conditions  –  including  market  access.  In  response  to  proposals  from  four 
African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali), WTO members set up a 
Cotton Sub-Committee within the negotiations to focus  specifically on issues and 
government policies that impact on the world cotton market. Singling out specific 
sectors  for  special  treatment  is  not  without  precedent  in  multilateral  trade 
negotiations. During the Uruguay Round, countries agreed to reduce tariffs to zero in 
numerous  sectors  including  agricultural  machinery,  beer,  certain  chemicals, 
construction equipment, distilled spirits (brown), furniture, medical equipment, paper, 
pharmaceuticals, steel, and toys (Laird, 1988).
9 Sometimes referred to as the “zero for 
zero”  approach,  sectoral  initiatives  to  eliminate  government  intervention  are 
considered a useful complement to tariff negotiations by export-oriented countries. 
Another zero tariff issue relates to “nuisance” tariffs in the agricultural negotiations. It 
has been argued that extremely low tariffs are nothing more than a nuisance that add 
                                                 
9 Unlike general tariff cuts, sectoral initiatives within the WTO are an informal Member-driven process 
and are considered voluntary. Not all countries agreed to reduce their tariffs to zero in these sectors. In 
the case of the cotton negotiations, however, all countries have accepted the special negotiating focus 
being placed on this sector.    18 
to paperwork but may not provide substantial tariff revenue to the importing country. 
In the past, negotiators have considered requiring tariffs below a certain level to be 
eliminated. While this practical issue has been raised in the non agricultural market 
access negotiations, no reference has been made to such initiatives in the agricultural 
negotiations.  
The main outstanding issues to be dealt with in the NAMA negotiations are  also 
outstanding issues for the Agricultural negotiations. These include the final form of 
the  tariff  reduction  formula  –  for  NAMA  a  choice  between  two  Swiss-style 
harmonization  formulas  –  the  size  of  tariff  reductions,  how  to  implement  S&DT 
provisions and how to treat newly acceded members (WTO 2006b). Negotiators are 
also attempting to implement further tariff reductions based on industry sectors, a 
request-and-offer  process
10  and  voluntary  reduction  of  existing  low  tariffs.  In 
addition,  they  have  also  agreed  to  present  new  schedules  in  the  2002  version  of 
Harmonized System of tariff nomenclature. 
Technical issues 
In  cataloguing  and  describing  some  of  the  conceptual  and  practical  issues  facing 
negotiators, we’ve also touched on some of the reasons why it has been so difficult to 
find  common  ground  on  these  issues.  Analysing  the  technical  issues  facing 
negotiators only serves to emphasize the complexity of their task. 
Once negotiators agreed that they would subject higher tariffs to deeper cuts, they 
were faced with the need to calculate ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) for non-ad 
valorem  tariffs  in  order  to  determine  the  size  of  cut  to  apply  to  each  tariff.  As 
calculation  of  AVEs  is  not  an  exact  science,  Members  ended  up  spending 
considerable time agreeing on an approach that would address everyone’s concerns 
and substantial additional time in calculating the AVEs. First, there was need to agree 
on a base period for the prices used to calculate AVEs. Periods in which world prices 
were relatively high would imply lower AVEs and thus lower tariff cuts. In the end, it 
                                                 
10    In  a  request-and-offer  negotiation,  a  country  will  target  specific  tariffs  they  would  like  to  see 
reduced by other countries and offer to reduce some of their own tariffs in return.    19 
was decided to choose average prices during the 1999-2001 period – primarily to 
ensure consistency between data on trade prices and tariff lines.  
The  source  of  the  price  data  for  calculating  AVEs  was  also  an  issue,  with  some 
countries wanting to use individual country import unit values at the disaggregated 
tariff line level and others preferring to use world import unit values at the HS6-digit 
level. Using individual country data would require proxies when no data existed or the 
data was clearly erroneous (no imports occurred at that tariff level over the 3-year 
period or irreconcilable divergences existed in the magnitude of import unit values) 
and  could  result  in  AVE  estimates  that  were  biased  downward  when  import  unit 
values were inflated due to the existence of rents. This was especially the case for 
some  products  where  most  or  all  trade  was  occurring  under  tariff  quotas  and/or 
preferential trade arrangements. In the end, it was agreed to use individual country 
import unit values, but with a series of filters to identify AVE calculations that might 
be biased downward. When potential bias was detected, a blended AVE would be 
calculated based on a weighted composite of individual country and world import unit 
values.  
Despite the considerable technical work already done in arriving at a methodology for 
calculating AVEs, several issues remain before the task is complete. There is still a 
need to agree on the treatment of raw and refined sugar tariff lines, two products 
identified as being so biased by government policies that average traded prices in the 
world are not representative and so a unique methodology is required. There is also 
the  need  to  agree  on  how  one  approximates  an  AVE  in  cases  where  insufficient 
information exists to utilize the agreed methodology. Sharma (2006a) has identified a 
number of difficulties one faces when calculating AVEs even when import values are 
not inflated. First, there is the issue of how to deal with missing import values. In 
some cases it is impossible to convert import unit value into the units used for the 
specific bound tariffs. This is due to the use of different units such as “per item” in the 
case of the tariff and “per kg” in the case of the import unit value. In other cases 
specific bound tariffs can only be roughly approximated because the level of detail 
required in the trade data is not available. This is commonly the case with technical 
tariffs that assess the duty on the “percentage volume of alcohol per hectoliter” or 
some other component. For some countries, there are different levels of aggregation   20 
between their tariffs and trade information, for example, with one being available at 
the HS-6 level and the other at the HS-8 level. Some tariffs are mixed, containing two 
specific components based on different units and cannot be converted to the same 
unit.  
Negotiators  agreed  that  the  AVE  calculations  would  be  carried  out  by  Members 
themselves,  rather  than  by  the  WTO  Secretariat.  This  decision  brings  with  it  the 
possibility that the AVEs countries would submit might not reflect those produced 
through a more consistent or precise treatment. In some of the cases listed above 
Members must make a subjective decision on what to do in order for a calculation to 
be made. As a result of these problems, each country’s calculations will have to be 
checked and agreed by all Members, a further time-consuming process. Preliminary 
work has already revealed some anomalies in calculations, raising questions about the 
validity of some estimates. Of course, none of this would have been necessary if all 
tariffs had previously been restricted to an ad valorem form. 
Once AVEs have been calculated, there remain serious technical issues with respect 
to the tariff thresholds used to define each tier and the depth of cut to apply to each 
tier. One question is whether there will be harmonization of tariffs within tiers, as one 
country has proposed, or whether there will be only one reduction rate per tier. The 
latter is simpler but can result in huge discontinuities when applied on tariffs found on 
either side of a threshold. For example, the tariff on product A in tier 2 will be larger 
than that of product B in tier 1 before the cut but smaller after the cut. In some cases 
the  discrepancies  can  carry  over  three  tiers.  One  of  the  tiered  formulas  being 
considered would place an initial tariff of 50 percent in tier 2 and subject it to a cut of 
55 percent, thus reducing it to 22.5 percent. An initial tariff of 76 percent, however, 
would be placed in tier 4 and subjected to a cut of 75 percent, thus reducing it to 19 
percent,  or  3.5  percentage  points  below  the  tariff  that  was  50  percent  before 
reduction! 
Another very thorny technical issue still to be resolved is the formula for calculating 
tariff quotas in the case of Sensitive Products. Perhaps the most difficult matter is 
deciding the basis for the quota. Where an Uruguay Round quota already exists for 
the product in question, it makes some sense to use it as the basis and to expand the 
quota by some proportion. Another proposal uses the greater of the quota or current   21 
imports  during  some  base  period,  relative  to  domestic  consumption,  as  the  basis. 
There are, however, several pervasive complications, not the least being severe data 
limitations. In particular, using domestic consumption in the formula is problematic 
since consumption data at the tariff line level usually does not exist. This is further 
complicated by the fact that many quotas include products from numerous tariff lines 
or that some tariff lines show up in more than one quota. Should Members be allowed 
‘partial designation’ in these  cases, or must they declare all tariff lines within an 
existing tariff quota as Sensitive Products? In all likelihood, the formula will also 
need to calculate the new or expanded quota based on varying tariff cut deviations 
from the tiered formula and based on the amount of current market access (hence the 
suggestion that either the quota or imports be relative to domestic consumption). 
In the case of Special Products, Members will be faced with a complicated technical 
issue if they decide to limit these products based on some of the suggested economic 
criteria. It has been suggested that, in order to qualify as a Special Product, a product 
should  be  contributing  to  a  country’s  food  security,  livelihood  security,  or  rural 
development. However, empirically demonstrating this is a complicated task, as the 
needed data is often sparse or of questionable reliability and concepts such as rural 
development are open to a wide degree of interpretation. 
While  the  list  of  outstanding  technical  issues  represent  a  series  of  tasks  that  will 
require extensive analysis, additional technical analysis is likely to be required to 
complete the negotiations. As negotiators deal with outstanding conceptual issues, the 
list of technical challenges will expand beyond the list identified in this paper. 
Issues for Economists 
As trade economists, we are keen to have the Doha Round concluded and for the final 
outcome to reflect economic principles. Based on the catalogue of technical, practical 
and conceptual issues outlined in this paper, there are challenges for economists as 
well as opportunities available to have a greater sway in the negotiations. 
As  Goldin  and  Knudsen  (1990)  have  pointed  out,  the  extent  to  which  economic 
analysis of agricultural trade liberalization relies on global models far exceeds that 
which is standard in policy analyses. To be manageable, these models have to distil   22 
the complexity of the world agricultural economy into an operational system with 
parameters and coefficients that capture the key interrelationships between policies 
and economic variables. Even the most complex models still capture only a stylized 
reflection of reality. 
One of the many technical challenges facing economists is deciding on the level of 
commodity aggregation to apply in quantitative analyses of proposals and potential 
trade outcomes. Typically, most quantitative analysis undertaken by trade economists 
has been highly aggregated in terms of countries and commodities. Trade negotiators, 
on the other hand, are dealing with individual tariff lines and quotas and are dubious 
of  analysis  undertaken  at  very  aggregate  levels.  Analysis  by  Buetre  et  al  (2004) 
indicated  that  there  is  some  basis  for  concern,  with  wide  disparity  in  estimated 
impacts of the same hypothetical tariff cut depending on the level of aggregation used 
in modelling. Some work has been undertaken to address negotiators’ concerns, but 
more work is required. 
The three main means used to address negotiators concerns are undertaking analysis 
on  a  tariff  line  basis;  working  to  improve  the  accuracy  of  the  tariff  aggregation 
procedure; and developing tools to apply tariff cuts at very disaggregated levels and 
calculate equivalent aggregate tariff reductions for use in existing models. 
At the 2006 Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) conference, Grant, Hertel and 
Rutherford (2006) presented a paper in which a general equilibrium model had been 
modified  to  allow  for  tariff  line  level  analysis  of  tariff  reductions  for  US  dairy 
products. While this work covers a single commodity group in only one country, a 
proposed  session  at  the  2007  GTAP  conference  has  been  dedicated  to  modelling 
agricultural protection at the individual tariff line level. As such, further work in this 
direction is underway. 
There are a number methods that have been developed to apply cuts at the tariff line 
level and calculate aggregated policy shocks for inclusion in existing models. For 
agriculture, a collaboration between the International Trade Centre, UNCTAD and 
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) resulted in the 
development of MacMaps. MacMaps is a database of tariffs with tools for applying 
tariff cuts and calculating the resulting weighted cut for use in models such as GTAP   23 
(Bouët et al 2005). ABARE has also developed and utilised a similar system in recent 
analysis  of  agricultural  trade  issues  (see  McDonald  et  al  2006).  The  Productivity 
Commission (Forbes et al 2004) developed a similar tool for the non agricultural 
market  access  negotiations  which  is  available  for  use 
(http://www.pc.gov.au/work/trade/itas/index.html).  All  three  systems  have 
incorporated information on bound and applied tariffs to improve the applicability of 
analysis for WTO negotiations.  
Some of the concerns that have been expressed about these systems are that they do 
not adequately deal with the interaction between tariff cuts and tariff quota expansion 
(for the agriculture related tools); that there is still a discrepancy between the level of 
tariffs in the negotiations and the level at which tariffs are represented in modelling 
systems
11; and that there is no information detailing that the aggregated tariff cuts 
used in subsequent models will adequately reflect the complexity of a proposal. More 
work is needed to demonstrate that these systems can provide accurate and timely 
information to negotiators. 
Some work has also been undertaken on improving the ability of models to represent 
aggregate tariffs accurately in trade models. Bach and Martin (1997) reviewed the 
existing methodology and proposed an improved method for calculating aggregate 
tariffs. This approach spells out a methodology for using readily available information 
to  calculate  aggregate  tariffs  that  more  accurately  reflect  the  average  protective 
burden  than  can  be  achieved  using  simple  or  weighted  averages.  However,  this 
approach has had negligible impact on the negotiations where discussions typically 
revolve around simple average tariffs. 
Based  on  the  extensive  work  that  has  been  undertaken  to  date,  a  range  of  issues 
require work by trade economists, most notably: 
                                                 
11 Both MacMaps and the publicly available version of ITAS have tariff information at the HS 6 digit 
level. For ITAS, more detailed tariff information has not been supplied because the WTO – which 
kindly allowed the data to be used – has an agreement with members that the data members supply to 
the WTO will not be made generally available below the HS 6 digit level (Forbes et al 2004).   24 
•  further  work  on  applying  tariff  cuts  at  the  tariff  line  level  in  quantitative 
analysis; 
•  extensive work on addressing the interaction between tariff cuts and quota 
expansions (given that quotas frequently cover more than one tariff line); and 
•  analysis of the implications of differences in the HS 1992, 2002 and 2007 
nomenclature for assessing tariff cuts. 
Two other areas also deserve significant attention from trade economists. More effort 
is needed on providing economic perspective to the complex issues being negotiated 
in Geneva as well as persuading trade negotiators, under growing pressure to reform 
their country’s policies, of the value of analytically based insights into the potential 
costs  and  benefits  of  trade  liberalization.  For  this  work  to  have  an  impact  it  is 
important that it be presented in a concise and accessible format for negotiators. The 
second area of attention is on assisting developing and least developed countries attain 
the  capacity  to  analyse  all  issues  being  negotiated.  The  Cancun  WTO  ministerial 
meeting demonstrated that developing countries were not willing to agree to reforms 
that they could not satisfy themselves would be beneficial to them. There appears 
little scope for concluding the current round of negotiations unless all countries are 
confident in the quantitative analysis they are undertaking. Only trade economists can 
provide the training and support for developing countries – while work has occurred 
in this area, this is an area that our profession needs to make more effort in if a 
successful conclusion to the round is to be achieved. 
Concluding Comments 
It  has  now  been  over  five  years  since  WTO  Members  began  what  are  the  most 
comprehensive  agricultural  negotiations  to  date  and  still  there  is  no  end  in  sight. 
While some may question if the political will exists to bring these negotiations to a 
conclusion, the complexity and level of detail in the issues being discussed has also 
contributed  to  the  inability  to  reach  agreement.  In  particular,  it  has  undoubtedly 
strained  the technical  and  administrative  capacity  of  many  of  the  WTO’s  smaller 
members, thus further contributing to the slow pace of the negotiations. 
While there has been some progress in the negotiations, there remain a number of 
complex issues to be resolved before an agreement can be reached. Some of these   25 
issues can be easily resolved, but it is fair to say that, despite intensive discussions, 
negotiators  remain  considerably  apart  on  a  host  of  issues,  including  the  tariff 
thresholds for each tier and the level of cut within each tier, Sensitive and Special 
Products, treatment of tropical products and products of particular importance to the 
diversification of production from the growing of illicit narcotic crops, and treatment 
of long-standing trade preferences and tariff escalation. The problems each of these 
issues pose are compounded by the fact that they are all interrelated. 
Nevertheless, most would agree that what is already on the table represents progress 
toward an agreement that could deliver improvement in market access for agricultural 
products. In reviewing the positions of major participants after the suspension of the 
negotiations in July, Gifford concluded that the reductions being considered in tariffs 
and subsidies are already well in excess of those negotiated in the Uruguay Round 
(Gifford, 2006). While some might consider this an indictment of the Uruguay Round 
achievements, the level of tariff cuts being discussed also compares favourably to the 
coverage and depth of cuts achieved at the Tokyo and Kennedy Rounds.
12 
The apprehension felt by some that the level of market access created does not meet 
the goal of “substantial improvements” is not without justification, however, as some 
WTO  Members  are  proposing  a  level  of  flexibility  be  granted  to  exempt  certain 
products from tariff cuts or cut these tariffs by lesser amounts that could significantly 
weaken the final agreement. Any exemptions would dilute the final agreement; the 
range  of  exemptions  being  proposed  by  some  could  gut  it.  As  mentioned,  two 
objectives of the Doha Round are to reduce tariff dispersion and tariff escalation. But, 
many of the tariff peaks targeted for the deepest cuts will be the very same tariff lines 
chosen for Sensitive Products and Special Products status. Negotiators need to be 
                                                 
12 The Uruguay Round delivered average agricultural tariff cuts of 36 percent for developed countries 
and  24  percent  for  developing  countries.  The  Tokyo  Round  succeeded  in  cutting  global  industrial 
tariffs by an estimated 35 percent. In the Kennedy Round, participants agreed to a 50 percent across-
the-board  reduction  in  industrial  tariffs  for  all  but  a  group  of  exempted  products.  After  all  the 
exceptions  were  negotiated,  industrial  country  tariffs  on  manufactured  items  were  reduced  by  an 
estimated 35 percent on average (Baldwin, 1987). Neither the Tokyo nor Kennedy Rounds resulted in 
cuts for agricultural tariffs. 
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wary of a tariff cutting formula that yields post-Doha tariff profiles similar to what 
could be achieved under a simple linear tariff cutting formula. 
Finally,  there  is  the  considerable  amount  of  technical  work  associated  with 
understanding the ramifications of multilateral trade reform for each Member. Each 
country  must  determine  which,  of  the  numerous  market  access  formulas  and  the 
coefficients and variables that are utilized by these formulas, yields the best outcome 
for  them.  The  depth  of  tariff  cuts  is  only  one  criterion  to  be  considered  when 
estimating the economic value of a tariff cutting formula. A better measure is the 
likely expansion in trade, still better is the likely expansion in economic welfare to the 
country as a whole. To estimate the trade and welfare impacts of tariff cuts some 
nations employ trade projection models. One problem facing all multilateral trade 
negotiations  is  the  highly  uneven  technical  expertise  across  the  participants.  In 
recognition of the need for developing countries to be able to generate their own 
empirical information, the UNCTAD Secretariat developed a partial equilibrium trade 
projections model during the Uruguay Round. The WTO has also attempted to fill the 
gap  in  expertise  between  rich  and  poor  countries  with  training  and  provision  of 
resources, but much more still needs to be done. One of the lessons negotiators might 
take from the Doha negotiations is the need to provide ample technical support to 
developing countries in order to satisfy them that they are signing on to an agreement 
that is consistent with their development objectives.   27 
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-  We have progressed on ad valorem equivalents.
7
 This has successfully created a basis for 
allocating items into bands for the tiered formula. 
 
-  We have a working hypothesis of four bands for structuring tariff cuts. 
 
-  There has been very considerable convergence on adopting a linear-based approach for 
cuts within those bands. Members have, of course, by no means formally abandoned 
positions that are even more divergent.
8
 We need now to narrow the extent of divergence 
that remains. This will include whether or not to include any "pivot" in any band. 
 
-  Members have made strong efforts to promote convergence on the size of actual cuts to 
be undertaken within those bands. But, even though genuine efforts have been made to 
move from formal positions (which of course remain), major gaps are yet to be bridged. 
Somewhat greater convergence has been achieved as regards the thresholds for the bands. 
Substantial movement is clearly essential to progress.
9 
 
-  Some Members continue to reject completely the concept of a tariff cap. Others have 
proposed
10




-  Members have been prepared to make concrete - albeit conditional - proposals on the 
number of sensitive products. But, in a situation where proposals extend from as little as 
1% to as much as 15% of tariff lines, further bridging this difference is essential to progress. 
 
-  The fundamental divergence over the basic approach to treatment of sensitive products 
needs to be resolved.
11
 Beyond that, there needs to be convergence on the consequential 
extent of liberalisation for such products. 
 
Special and Differential Treatment 
-  Just as for developed countries, there is a working hypothesis of four bands for 
developing countries. There is no disagreement on lesser cuts within the bands. A   31 
certain body of opinion is open to considering cuts of two-thirds of the amount of the 
cuts for developed countries as a plausible zone in which to search more intensively for 
convergence.
12
 But significant disagreement on that remains, and divergence is, if 





-  Some Members continue to reject completely the concept of a tariff cap for developing 
countries. Others have proposed
14
 a cap at 150%. 
 
-  For sensitive products, there is no disagreement that there should be greater flexibility for 






-  Regarding designation of special products, there has been a clear divergence between 
those Members which consider that, prior to establishment of schedules, a list of 
nonexhaustive and illustrative criteria-based indicators should be established and those 
Members which are looking for a list which would act as a filter or screen for the selection of 
such products. Latterly, it has been proposed (but not yet discussed with Members as a whole) 
that a developing country Member should have the right to designate at least 20 per cent of its 
agricultural tariff lines as Special Products, and be further entitled to designate an SP where, 
for that product, an AMS has been notified and exports have taken place. This issue needs to 
be resolved as part of modalities so that there is assurance of the basis upon which Members 
may designate special products. 
 
-  Some moves toward convergence on treatment of Special Products have been made 
recently. Some Members had considered that special products should be fully exempt from 
any new market access commitments whatsoever and have automatic access to the SSM. 
Others had argued there should be some degree of market opening for these products, albeit 
reflecting more flexible treatment than for other products. In the presence of this fundamental 
divergence, it had clearly been impossible to undertake any definition of what such flexibility 
would be. Genuine convergence is obviously urgently needed. There is now a new proposal 
for a tripartite categorization of Special Products involving limited tariff cuts for at least a 
proportion of such products which remains to be fully discussed. It remains to be seen 
whether this discussion can help move us forward. 
 
Special Safeguard Mechanism 
 
-  There is agreement that there would be a special safeguard mechanism and that it should be 
tailored to the particular circumstances and needs of developing countries. There is no 
material disagreement with the view that it should have a quantity trigger. Nor is there 
disagreement with the view that it should at least be capable of addressing effectively what 
might be described as import "surges". Divergence remains over whether, or if so how, 
situations that are lesser than "surge" are to be dealt with. There is, however, agreement that 
any remedy should be of a temporary nature. There remains strong divergence however on 
whether, or if so how, a special safeguard should be "price-based" to deal specifically with 
price effects. 
 
-  There is some discernible openness, albeit at varying levels, to at least consider coverage of 
products that are likely to undergo significant liberalisation effects, and/or are already bound 
at low levels and/or are special products. Beyond that, however, there remains a fundamental 
divergence between those considering all products should be eligible for such a mechanism 
and those opposing such a blanket approach. 
 
   32 
 
Other Elements (Author’s note: see below for relevant paragraphs of July 2004 
Framework text) 
 
17. There has been no further material convergence on the matters covered by paragraphs 35 
and 37 of the July 2004 Framework text. The same may be said for paragraph 36 on tariff 
escalation, albeit that there is full agreement on the need for this to be done, and a genuine 
recognition of the particular importance of this for commodities exporters. Certain concrete 
proposals have been made on paragraph 38 (SSG) and met with opposition from some 
Members. 
 
18. Concrete proposals have been made and discussed on how to implement paragraph 43 of 
the July 2004 Framework on tropical and diversification products. But there remains 
divergence over the precise interpretation of this section of the July Framework
16
 and no 
common approach has been established. 
 
19. The importance of long-standing preferences pursuant to paragraph 44 of the July 2004 
Framework is fully recognised and concrete proposals regarding preference erosion have been 
made and discussed.
17
 There seems not to be inherent difficulty with a role for capacity 
building. However, while there is some degree of support for e.g. longer implementation 
periods for at least certain products in order to facilitate adjustment, there is far from 
convergence on even this. Some argue it is not sufficient or certainly not in all cases, while 




7  The method for calculating the AVEs for the sugar lines is still to be established. 
8  At one end of the spectrum, as it were, a "harmonisation" formula within the bands; at the other end 
"flexibility" within the formula. 
9  The matrix below is an illustrative table that portrays the extent of divergences that remain, even on 
the basis of post-August 2005 proposals. This does not entirely cover all the subtleties of those 
proposals to utilize a "pivot" (although most are in fact within the ranges tabulated), but is intended to 
convey a snapshot of the status of average cuts proposed post-August. 
 
   Thresholds        Range of cuts (%) 
Band 1     0% -  20/30%     20-65 
Band 2     20/30% -  40/60%   30-75 
Band 3     40/60% -  60/90%   35-85 
Band 4     >60/90%     42-90 
 
10  As an element in certain conditional proposals on overall market access, tabled post-July 2005. 
11  Some see this as being tariff quota based and expressed as a percentage of domestic consumption, 
with proposals of up to 10%. Others propose pro rata expansion on an existing trade basis, including 
taking account of current imports. Some also propose no new TRQs, with sensitivity in such cases to be 
provided through other means, e.g. differential phasing. There is also a proposal for a "sliding scale" 
approach. 
12  In this pillar, as well as in the other two, there is general convergence on the point that developing 
countries will have entitlement to longer implementation periods, albeit that concrete precision remains 
to be determined. 
13  The matrix below is an illustrative table that portrays the extent of divergences that remain, just on 
the basis of post-August 2005 proposals. 
 
   Thresholds      Range of cuts (%) 
Band 1     0% -  20/50%     15-25* 
Band 2     20/50% -  40/100%   20-30* 
Band 3     40/100% -  60/150%   25-35* 
Band 4     >60-150%     30-40*   33 
*There is also a proposal that cuts for developing countries should be "slightly lesser" than the upper 
tariff cuts for developed countries shown in the preceding table (i.e.: "slightly lesser" than 65, 75, 85 
and 90%). 
14  As an element in certain conditional proposals on overall market access, tabled post-July 2005. 
15  While the eventual zone of convergence for developed countries undoubtedly has a bearing in this 
area, it has been proposed by a group of Members that the principles of sensitive products generally 
and for TRQs specifically should be different for developing countries. Another group of Members has 
proposed, in the post-August period, an entitlement for developing countries of at least 50% more than 
the maximum number of lines used by any developed Member. This would (based on developed 
country proposals) amount to a potential variation between 1.5% and 22.5% of tariff lines. This latter 
group has also proposed that products relating to long-standing preferences shall be designated as 
sensitive and that any TRQ expansion should not be "at the detriment of existing ACP quotas". This 
particular view has been, however, strongly opposed by other Members which take the firm position 
that tropical and diversification products should not at all be designated as sensitive products. 
16  It is argued by some Members that this is to be interpreted as meaning full duty-  and tariff quota-
free access, but by others as less than that. 
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35. Other elements that will give the flexibility required to reach a final balanced result 
include reduction or elimination of in-quota tariff rates, and operationally effective 
improvements in tariff quota administration for existing tariff quotas so as to enable 
Members, and particularly developing country Members, to fully benefit from the market 
access opportunities under tariff rate quotas. 
 
36. Tariff escalation will be addressed through a formula to be agreed. 
 
37. The issue of tariff simplification remains under negotiation. 
 
38. The question of the special agricultural safeguard (SSG) remains under negotiation. 
 
Special and differential treatment  
 
44. The importance of long-standing preferences is fully recognised. The issue of 
preference erosion will be addressed. For the further consideration in this regard, 
paragraph 16 and other relevant provisions of TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1 will be used as a 
reference. 
 
MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE 
 
48. Article 18 of the Agreement on Agriculture will be amended with a view to enhancing 
monitoring so as to effectively ensure full transparency, including through timely and 
complete notifications with respect to the commitments in market access, domestic 
support and export competition. The particular concerns of developing countries in this 
regard will be addressed. 
 